Everstone Group.
A $3.2bn, five-fund mid-market buyout platform that says it returned $2bn to LPs in five years — while its marquee consumer exit, Burger King India, took 13 years and heavy dilution to clear barely above its 2020 IPO price.
GW GP Score
Everstone is the control-buyout counterpoint to India's venture-heavy PE conversation: a $3.2bn, five-fund platform built since 2006 by co-founders Sameer Sain and Atul Kapur, underwritten on mid-market EBITDA thresholds (buy at ₹100-250 Cr, exit at ₹400-500 Cr) rather than growth-round pricing. The realisation record is strong in aggregate — Vice Chairman Avnish Mehra states $2bn returned to LPs against roughly $600M deployed over the five years to mid-2024, with two disclosed exit IRRs (Everise's 59.3%, SJS Enterprises' GW-estimated ~30%) — but uneven position by position. The flagship consumer name, Burger King India (held via QSR Asia/Restaurant Brands Asia), took 13 years and progressive dilution down to just 11.26% before a full exit closed in July 2026 barely above its December 2020 IPO price. The 2025-26 cheque book has pivoted to control buyouts of established assets: Wingify, Qlar Group carved out of Blackstone, and full ownership of the EverYondr data-centre JV after Yondr's exit — funded ahead of a Fund V raise targeting $800M-1bn, nearly double Fund IV. The open question is whether that bigger fund buys the same discipline the realisation numbers claim, or more of the platform risk that sits inside the healthcare book (PharmEasy's 2023 rights issue is the clearest mark against it).
Re-up candidate: the realised-cash evidence is doing more work than the brand story.
Portfolio quality depends on a narrow theme; the right comp is concentration risk, not headline unicorn count.
No named analyst override yet; current view is generated from the scored dossier and should be refreshed when the next primary source lands.
Everstone Capital Partners V final close size and date (target $800M-1bn; first close ~$300-400M reported mid-2025; IFC committed $60M Nov 2025).
Everlife/Translumina DRHP filing — targeted for an Oct 2025 IPO at ₹6,000 Cr combined valuation; not filed as of Sep 2026.
PharmEasy/API Holdings: a ₹3,500 Cr rights issue (2023) and a reported heavy markdown from the 2021 peak sit inside a franchise that markets itself on realisation discipline.
Computed from current dossier sources; analyst override pending.
Scored on a genuinely strong realisation record — $2bn self-reported returned to LPs against ~$600M deployed over five years, plus two disclosed exit IRRs — offset by a control book whose asset quality carries one conspicuous distress mark (PharmEasy) and a flagship exit (Burger King India) that took 13 years to clear barely above its IPO price: 0.25×65 + 0.30×80 + 0.15×68 + 0.15×72 + 0.15×70 = 71.75 → 72.
Graded underPrivate equity rubric v1.0→Control or majority stakes across most of the live book (Wingify 76.84%, Qlar 100%, Everlife/Translumina 60-70%), offset by PharmEasy's distress mark and Burger King India's dilution to a residual 11.26% stake before exit
$2bn self-reported returned to LPs on ~$600M deployed (5 yrs); two disclosed IRRs (Everise 59.3%, SJS ~30% GW estimate); Burger King India's 13-year, low-return exit is the counterweight
Everise's buy-and-build turnaround (2.2x in under two years) and IndoSpace's ground-up platform-building are genuine operating stories; PharmEasy's growth-funded distress cuts against the same thesis
Stated EBITDA entry/exit bands (₹100-250 Cr → ₹400-500 Cr) and a Fund V target nearly double Fund IV's $500M, backed by an IFC anchor; the 2016-2023 gap between Fund III and Fund IV was unusually long
Co-founders Sain and Kapur remain in place 20 years after founding, with a stable senior bench (Mehra, Mukim, Jain); no confirmed 2024-25 MD-level departures found, though a prior PE-team exit was reported
Asset quality & control 25% · Exit realisation 30% · Value creation 15% · Capital discipline 15% · Franchise stability 15% — the five contributions above sum to 72. Raw scores compare within private equity; across cohorts compare the tier. See the full GP Score methodology · compare this firm →
Positive catalysts and/or re-up evidence exceed the visible risks, but the score should move only after the named proof lands.
Everlife Holdings + Translumina Therapeutics liquidity clears with credible OFS/block-sale evidence.
Everlife/Translumina DRHP filing — targeted for an Oct 2025 IPO at ₹6,000 Cr combined valuation; not filed as of Sep 2026.
Everstone Capital Partners V final close size and date (target $800M-1bn; first close ~$300-400M reported mid-2025; IFC committed $60M Nov 2025).
The realisation math is real: $2bn returned against $600M deployed in five years is a genuine DPI story for a mid-market India-SE Asia shop, and Fund V's bigger $800M-1bn target with an IFC anchor confirms LP demand. But underwrite position by position, not the aggregate — Burger King India needed 13 years and heavy dilution to clear barely above its IPO price, and PharmEasy's rights issue shows the platform-scaling playbook can also destroy value.
PharmEasy/API Holdings: a ₹3,500 Cr rights issue (2023) and a reported heavy markdown from the 2021 peak sit inside a franchise that markets itself on realisation discipline.
Everstone Capital Partners V final close size and date (target $800M-1bn; first close ~$300-400M reported mid-2025; IFC committed $60M Nov 2025).
Coverage initiated: inaugural GW GP Score.
Catalyst exposure · latest source pressure
Recent public evidence mapped to this GP. Read this before reading the position table: it is where the score can move next.
Keep the file warm; current events cut both ways or are not yet material enough to move score.
Attribution0 positive catalyst(s), 0 pressure catalyst(s); top driver: monthly refresh only.
The funds
$3.2bn PE AUM across 5 flagship funds (Everstone, 2026); ~$6bn group-wide incl. IndoSpace real estate (Tracxn est.) across 6 tracked vehicles.
| Vehicle | Vintage | Size | Stage | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Everstone Capital Partners V | 2025 (raising)Recovery / IPO window | Target $800M-1bn | Mid-market buyout / growth | First close ~$300-400M reported mid-2025; IFC committed $60M, Nov 2025; final close expected 2026 |
| Everstone Capital Partners IV | 2023Trough window | $500M | Mid-market buyout / growth | — |
| Everstone Capital Partners III | 2016First boom | $731M | Mid-market buyout / growth | 90% of invested capital distributed by early 2024, per Everstone |
| Everstone Capital Partners II | 2010Foundation era | $580M | Mid-market buyout / growth | — |
| Everstone Capital Partners I | 2006Foundation era | $425M | Growth / expansion | — |
| IndoSpace Logistics Parks (JV platform) | 2007-2023Foundation era | ~$3bn AUM across ILP I-IV + Core | Industrial & logistics real estate | JV with GLP and Realterm, run alongside (not inside) the flagship PE fund family; CPP Investments anchors IndoSpace Core |
Fund analytics · LP underwriting screen
Computed from the public dossier: vehicle cadence, realised exits, mark drift, concentration and franchise stability. All computed signals are GW estimates.
Latest vehicle is still in market or not publicly closed.
Next liquidityEverlife Holdings + Translumina Therapeutics · SJS Enterprises
2 visible exit events since Jul 2024.
Latest vehicle is still in market or not publicly closed.
3 up / 1 flat / 3 down tracked signals.
No senior departure flagged in key people.
3 up / 1 flat / 3 down
2 events since Jul 2024
Largest tracked active exposure
Higher spread = less balanced franchise
Marked overhangRestaurant Brands Asia (Burger King India/Indonesia) · API Holdings (PharmEasy) · SJS Enterprises: names with negative 12-month mark or momentum signals in the reconstructed book.
Exit-led repricing; entry discipline decisive
Best entry conditions of the cycle
Unicorn discovery; pricing still forming
Pre-unicorn pricing; discovery-cost entries
Merger of the two platforms announced Jun 2024 ahead of a targeted Oct 2025 IPO at a combined ₹6,000 Cr (~$720M) valuation; no DRHP filed as of Sep 2026 — the listing has slipped.
Stake grew to 77.8% by its Nov 2021 IPO; fully exited Aug 2023 (final 29.5% for ~$66M) — sector forced to Logistics & Infra; SJS makes decorative aesthetics for the auto and appliance industries.
At least one cited source is dated 2026.
7 visible events tracked.
11 representative positions tracked.
No departure signal structured.
Fund-level DPI/TVPI is usually not public; proxy remains estimated.
Peer median 3 · -1
Peer median 2 · +0
Peer median 89 · -5
Peer median 38 · -38
Peer median 0 · +0
Diligence agenda · how this view can change
The live research question, the proof required, and the source standard. This prevents a GP score from becoming a stale label.
The latest vehicle is raising, unclosed or stale against the current deployment cycle.
Current · At least one cited source is dated 2026.
Everlife/Translumina DRHP filing — targeted for an Oct 2025 IPO at ₹6,000 Cr combined valuation; not filed as of Sep 2026.
Track first/final close, LP quality, target-vs-close delta and mandate shift.
Everlife/Translumina DRHP filing — targeted for an Oct 2025 IPO at ₹6,000 Cr combined valuation; not filed as of Sep 2026.
Everlife Holdings + Translumina Therapeutics: next public-market or secondary print
Evidence quality · source file health
How hard the public record is beneath this view: source mix, freshness, low-confidence fields and the next source action.
No major evidence gap flagged.
25 total sources · 32% primary
At least one cited source is dated 2026.
Everstone Capital: acquisition of Qlar Group from Blackstone (7 May 2026)
Maintain monthly source check; escalate on fund close, DRHP, OFS, block sale or senior-partner change.
Source tiering follows Gravitywell policy: primary = filing/regulator/company disclosure, secondary = reputable media or research, E = Gravitywell estimate. Evidence score is a GW control metric, not an external rating.
The position book
Five flagship PE funds since 2006 plus the IndoSpace real-estate JV; 11 positions tracked below across the current and recently exited book.
| Company | Sector | Entered | Entry stage | Status | 12-mo signal | Latest read |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restaurant Brands Asia (Burger King India/Indonesia) | Consumer & Commerce | 2013 | JV control (Everstone + Burger King Worldwide) | Public | ▼ | QSR Asia's stake was diluted from 41% (2023) to 11.26% by the Jan 2026 exit agreement after repeated capital calls funded RBA's rollout; sold to Inspira Global at ₹70/share, deal closed 8 Jul 2026. |
| IndoSpace | Logistics & Infra | 2007 | JV control (w/ GLP, Realterm) | Private | ▲ | 52 logistics parks, 58 msf delivered/under development; ILP III closed at $580M equity / $1.2bn with leverage (2019); CPP Investments anchored IndoSpace Core with $205M (Jan 2023). |
| EverYondr (data centres) | Logistics & Infra | 2021 | JV, converted to full ownership 2025 | Private | ▲ | $1bn JV with Yondr Group (Jul 2021) for Mumbai and Hyderabad data centres; Yondr exited and Everstone took full control 29 Jul 2025 — sector forced to Logistics & Infra, the taxonomy's closest fit for physical digital infrastructure. |
| Qlar Group (formerly Schenck Process) | Logistics & Infra | 2026 | Buyout from Blackstone | Private | · | Acquired 7 May 2026; German-origin material-handling equipment for cement, steel and mining — sector forced to Logistics & Infra, the closest fit for industrial-equipment manufacturing. |
| Wingify (VWO) | SaaS & Dev Tools | 2025 | Majority buyout | Private | ▲ | 76.84% stake (as of 31 Mar 2025) for ~$200M / ₹1,250 Cr; founder Paras Chopra retains 10.45% and a board seat. |
| Omega Healthcare | Healthcare | 2019 | Co-control buyout (w/ Goldman Sachs Alternatives) | Private | → | 19% acquired 2019; 9% sold to Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan (announced Jan 2025) in a deal valuing Omega at ~$1.8bn; Everstone retains 10%. |
| Everlife Holdings + Translumina Therapeutics | Healthcare | 2019 | Control stakes (70% Everlife, 60% Translumina) | Private | · | Merger of the two platforms announced Jun 2024 ahead of a targeted Oct 2025 IPO at a combined ₹6,000 Cr (~$720M) valuation; no DRHP filed as of Sep 2026 — the listing has slipped. |
| API Holdings (PharmEasy) | Healthcare | 2020 | Minority (via Ascent Health merger) | Private | ▼ | Partly exited 2021 (2% sold to B Capital for $20M); PharmEasy needed a ₹3,500 Cr rights issue (2023) after a reported valuation markdown from its 2021 peak — the book's clearest distress mark. |
| Modern Foods | Consumer & Commerce | 2016 | Buyout (HUL bread-bakery carve-out) | Acquired | · | Sold to Grupo Bimbo, Feb 2021, for an undisclosed sum. |
| Servion Global Solutions | SaaS & Dev Tools | 2014 | Control buyout | Acquired | · | ~$74M committed since 2014 (incl. a further $8M in 2017); sold to EMK Capital, Nov 2023. |
| SJS Enterprises | Logistics & Infra | 2015 | Buyout, 51% for ~$50M | Acquired | ▼ | Stake grew to 77.8% by its Nov 2021 IPO; fully exited Aug 2023 (final 29.5% for ~$66M) — sector forced to Logistics & Infra; SJS makes decorative aesthetics for the auto and appliance industries. |
Representative tracked positions reconstructed from public disclosures: not the full book. 12-mo signal is a GW estimate of mark direction from round/exit prints (E). Ownership stakes are not shown: not reliably public.
Sector exposure · where the book leans
Share of the tracked active book by normalized sector (GW estimate): read against our sector dossiers for crowding.
New cheques · 2025-26
Three cheques since Jan 2025, each a control buyout, not a growth check: Wingify's majority stake (₹1,250 Cr), full ownership of EverYondr's data centres after Yondr's exit, and Qlar Group carved out of Blackstone's German industrial-equipment business. Every 2025-26 position hands Everstone board and operating control, consistent with the mid-market buyout mandate Fund V is raising against — a smaller, slower cheque book than the venture cohort's, by design.
German material-handling equipment maker, carved out of Blackstone's portfolio
Yondr Group exited; Everstone took 100% of the Mumbai/Hyderabad data-centre JV
76.84% stake; founder Paras Chopra retains 10.45% and a board seat
Realisation · are LPs getting paid?
The aggregate claim is strong — $2bn returned to LPs against ~$600M deployed over five years (Mehra, Jun 2024) — and two positions carry disclosed, dated IRRs (Everise 59.3%, SJS Enterprises an estimated ~30%). But the franchise's best-known name is the outlier: Burger King India took nearly 13 years and successive dilutive capital raises to close a full exit in Jul 2026 at a price barely above its Dec 2020 listing. Read together, Everstone's realisation engine works reliably on business-services and industrials exits; the one large consumer platform bet took far longer to pay back than the fund cadence implies.
QSR Asia's 11.26% stake plus RBA's change of control sold to Inspira Global; agreed 20 Jan 2026 at ₹70/share (~17% above the Dec 2020 ₹60 IPO price after nearly 13 years), completed 8 Jul 2026 following a mandatory open offer.
9% of the 19% stake acquired in 2019 sold to Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan alongside Goldman Sachs Alternatives, in a co-control deal valuing Omega at ~$1.8bn; Everstone retains 10%.
Customer-experience outsourcing platform sold to Warburg Pincus; ~2.2x gross MoIC and 59.3% USD IRR achieved in under two years, per Everstone's own disclosed case study.
Sold to EMK Capital; Everstone had committed ~$74M since first investing in 2014.
Final 29.5% stake sold for ~$66M, completing the exit begun at IPO; combined with the 2021 OFS, an estimated $150-160M realised on a 2015 entry (~30% gross USD IRR, GW estimate).
Sold 13M shares in the Nov 2021 IPO, cutting the stake from 77.8% to 34.8%.
Sold to Grupo Bimbo for an undisclosed sum; entered via the Apr 2016 HUL bread-and-bakery carve-out.
Self-reported by Vice Chairman Avnish Mehra against ~$600M deployed in the same window (Outlook Business, Jun 2024)
Sold to Warburg Pincus, Oct 2023, in under two years — Everstone's own disclosed case-study metric
Combined 2021 IPO OFS + 2023 block sale on a 2015 ~$50M/51% entry; ~30% gross USD IRR, GW estimate
~17% above the Dec 2020 ₹60 IPO price after nearly 13 years and heavy interim dilution; deal closed Jul 2026
Fund-level DPI/TVPI are not public. The self-reported $2bn-returned-on-$600M-deployed ratio and the two disclosed IRRs are the strongest proof points in the cohort; they sit alongside one flagship name, Burger King India, that took 13 years to return barely more than its IPO price, and one platform, PharmEasy, that needed a rescue rights issue. GW reads the book as genuinely realisation-led but uneven across positions, not uniformly strong. E.
What they're doing
Control or near-control buyouts financed by a fund family grown from $425M (Fund I, 2006) to a $800M-1bn target for Fund V, raising 2025-26 with an IFC anchor commitment of $60M (Nov 2025).
Entry/exit discipline stated in EBITDA terms: buy mid-market businesses at ₹100-250 Cr EBITDA, target exit once EBITDA reaches ₹400-500 Cr (Avnish Mehra, Jun 2024).
A standing real-asset platform run outside the PE fund family — IndoSpace (logistics real estate, JV with GLP/Realterm) and EverYondr (data centres) — gives Everstone infrastructure exposure the flagship funds don't carry directly.
Healthcare consolidation via control stakes (Omega Healthcare, Everlife/Translumina) aimed at a merger-then-list exit route, the same playbook several cohort peers are running in the same vertical.
What can break
PharmEasy/API Holdings: a ₹3,500 Cr rights issue (2023) and a reported heavy markdown from the 2021 peak sit inside a franchise that markets itself on realisation discipline.
Burger King India needed 13 years and progressive dilution from a much larger promoter stake down to 11.26% before Everstone could fully exit, at a price barely above its Dec 2020 IPO level — a caution on how long a control platform can take to return capital even after a public listing.
The Everlife/Translumina IPO, targeted for Oct 2025 at a combined ₹6,000 Cr valuation, had not filed a DRHP as of Sep 2026: the healthcare-platform listing exit route is running behind its own stated timetable.
Sector concentration: on GW's reconstruction, Healthcare and Logistics & Infra together are ~62% of the tracked active book, leaving the franchise exposed to a shock in either regulatory-heavy vertical.
Everstone Capital Partners V final close size and date (target $800M-1bn; first close ~$300-400M reported mid-2025; IFC committed $60M Nov 2025).
Everlife/Translumina DRHP filing — targeted for an Oct 2025 IPO at ₹6,000 Cr combined valuation; not filed as of Sep 2026.
Omega Healthcare: whether Everstone's remaining 10% is sold in a further Ontario Teachers'-led round.
Any further disclosure of Everstone/QSR Asia's realised proceeds from Restaurant Brands Asia now that the Inspira Global deal has closed (8 Jul 2026).
Point-in-time discipline: these are the open items we could not verify at the current vintage. They get resolved: confirmed, corrected or dropped, at the next monthly refresh, never silently.
The takes · one screen, three readers
The realisation math is real: $2bn returned against $600M deployed in five years is a genuine DPI story for a mid-market India-SE Asia shop, and Fund V's bigger $800M-1bn target with an IFC anchor confirms LP demand. But underwrite position by position, not the aggregate — Burger King India needed 13 years and heavy dilution to clear barely above its IPO price, and PharmEasy's rights issue shows the platform-scaling playbook can also destroy value.
Everstone's edge is patience with control: five funds since 2006, a real-asset platform (IndoSpace, EverYondr) built alongside the PE book, and a habit of buying carved-out or distressed assets (Qlar from Blackstone, Servion's later sale to EMK) rather than competing at auction on growth multiples. Competing for its healthcare consolidation plays means matching that hold-period patience, not just the cheque size.
Watch Everlife/Translumina as the next India healthcare-platform listing test: a ₹6,000 Cr merger-then-IPO structure that has already missed its Oct 2025 target. A 2026-27 listing would join Omega Healthcare's partial exit as evidence the diagnostics/med-device consolidation trade is realising; continued slippage is a data point for every cohort firm banking on the same route.
Sourcing. Every figure is sourced and dated. We tier provenance: Primary (official, regulatory, exchange or company filings), Secondary (tier-1 industry research and reputable media), and GW estimate (our own reconstruction or opinion, labelled, never presented as external fact). We prefer primary where it exists, reconcile divergent prints to cited ranges, and hold every number point-in-time: dated, and never silently restated; revisions publish as dated changes.
Fact vs opinion. Facts vs opinion: market sizes, official prints, prices, named deals and agency ratings are sourced facts (Primary/Secondary). Scores, grades, purity weights, scenario paths and indicative sparkline points are Gravitywell's analytical opinion (GW estimate): labelled, not presented as external data.
GW GP Scores are research opinions, not investment advice, not a solicitation, and not an assessment under any SEBI regulation. Dossiers are compiled from public sources believed reliable; firms named did not participate and figures marked E are Gravitywell estimates. Point-in-time: dated to the vintage shown and never silently restated.