Domestic managers now write three of every four rupees of large-ticket credit here, and did so in the same half-year that global private credit posted record defaults. But domestic investors supply only 53.3% of the capital those managers lend, against 48.2% two years ago. The handover is real, and slower than the number in circulation.
₹1 crore = 10 million; ₹1 lakh crore = ₹1 trillion. USD as sourced; this desk converts at ₹87.5/US$ (22 Aug 2026). FY = April–March; H1 2026 = January–Jun 2026. Figures nominal. SEBI fund data as of 31 Mar 2026; deal data H1 2026; market levels 22 Aug 2026. Estimates are ranges. Two words this report never confuses: a domestic manager is a fund house domiciled in India, which is what deal-value shares count; a domestic investor is the source of the money that manager lends, which is what SEBI’s fund tables count.
Tiers: ● filed ◐ modeled/derived ○ Gravitywell Research estimate. Independent research across Credit Research, Capital Markets, Industry & Sector Research, Economy & Policy and Risk & Analytics, for readers who allocate capital, underwrite risk or set policy. Not regulated ratings or investment advice. Executive Summary (p3) and Quick Read (p7) stand alone. Methodology, Sources, Glossary, Exhibits, Data Appendix and Disclosures run from p32.
Three of every four rupees of large-ticket private credit written in India in the first half of 2026 came from a domestic manager. Slightly more than half the capital those managers hold came from a domestic investor.31 Both statements are true, and the market is only quoting the first. That gap is what this report is about. India's private credit is being described as having gone home just as the global asset class entered its first genuine stress. The weakest of the three available measures is carrying that description.
The strongest available measure of whose money it is sits in SEBI's own quarterly fund tables. It puts the domestic share of Category II capital at 53.3% on 31 Mar 2026, up from 48.2% two years earlier.128 That is a drift of about two and a half points a year. It is real, it is in the right direction, and it is nothing like a regime change. The 74% figure is a share of deal value by the manager's domicile, above a US$10m cut, over a single half-year.3 A manager in Mumbai lending money raised in Singapore counts as fully domestic on that measure and as roughly half foreign on SEBI's.
What makes the gap matter is the direction the two measures move in when foreign capital retreats. A domicile share is a ratio. It rises when the numerator grows or when the denominator shrinks, and this half it was mostly the denominator. Deployment fell to US$3.5bn from US$9.0bn a year earlier, which is 61% lower, or 38% lower once the single US$3.4bn financing that inflated the earlier half is stripped out.35 Deals above US$120m dropped from 27% of value to 18%.3 Domestic managers did not out-compete foreign ones for the same book. They kept writing at roughly their own pace while the largest cheques, which are the ones foreign funds write, stopped arriving.
None of this makes the domestic build a fiction. Domestic commitments are growing faster than foreign ones. Two-thirds of the money added to Category II funds over the past year came from domestic investors.128 In Jul 2026, after our data window closed, Shapoorji Pallonji raised about ₹151bn entirely from Indian subscribers. It is among the largest private credit financings the country has seen.16 That deal is the best evidence against the caution in this report and we print it at full weight. The house view is that one financing is not a run rate, and that the capital behind the domestic bid is more promised than delivered: ₹8.30 lakh crore of Category II commitments were still uncalled at 31 Mar 2026, and the proportion actually drawn fell to 34.9% in the very quarter commitments hit a record.128
Two of these findings are about the market and two are about the measurement. We treat the measurement problems as findings, not caveats. The market is being described, priced and allocated to on the basis of the number they concern.
The decisions this report is meant to change are about diligence questions and pacing, not about whether India private credit is a good asset class. It is structurally advantaged. Bank credit is constrained at the edges, borrowers pay 14–22% for speed and structure, and the domestic savings pool behind it is growing.3 The risk is not the thesis. The risk is buying a capacity build at the top of a formation cycle on a mis-measured claim about who is funding it.
Ask the manager for the LP split by source of capital, not by domicile of the feeder. Then ask what share of the fund's commitments has been called. The two numbers that matter are not published: the fund's own domestic share of capital, and its draw pace against vintage. A manager who cannot give you both quickly has not been asked before. Pace new commitments against called capital rather than headline fund size, because the industry's drawn ratio fell while commitments hit a record.1
Price the real-estate concentration as a correlation problem, not a sector view. 35% of H1 deal value went to one sector, and it is the sector surveyed lenders themselves ranked most likely to default.321 The book has also moved down-ticket, with US$10–60m deals now 61% of value against 51% a half earlier. That means more borrowers, thinner disclosure and less negotiating leverage per deal.3 Underwrite for a developer refinancing failure that arrives without a public tape to warn you.
The current settings push credit supply offshore and call it de-risking. Capping regulated entities at 10% of a scheme protects bank balance sheets. It also removes the steadiest, most supervised source of domestic capital from the market you want domestically funded.6 Meanwhile the Feb 2026 borrowing reform makes the offshore route cheaper and more flexible than it has ever been.9 The measurement gap is also fixable at no cost: SEBI already collects a credit-only cut of Category II and does not publish it. Publishing it would end this argument.
Medium conviction, Cautious. We are not calling a break in India private credit and we do not expect one on a two-quarter horizon. We are saying the decoupling case rests on a measure that flatters itself when foreign money leaves. The capital behind the domestic bid is 53% domestic and two-thirds uncalled. And the sector taking the largest share of it is the one its own lenders rank riskiest. Underwrite the vintage, not the narrative.
| Row | Content |
|---|---|
| The consensus | India's private credit market is buoyant and increasingly self-funded. EY's H1 2026 report puts domestic funds at 74% of deal value and nearly 79% of deal count, records the half at US$3.5bn as "broadly in line" with H2 2025's US$3.4bn, and reports that roughly 73% of surveyed investors expect strong activity over the next one to two years, with 60% outright bullish.3 The read in the trade press is maturation and insulation from a stressing global asset class.21 |
| The house delta | Domestic investors supply 53.3% of Category II capital, not 74%, and that share has moved 48.2% → 50.8% → 53.3% over two years: about 2.5 points a year.128 On the flow rather than the stock the house is closer to consensus, at 65.8% of the past year's capital increment.28 We are not at consensus on direction. We are far from it on pace, and we read the H1 print as a contraction the framing hides: US$3.5bn against US$9.0bn a year earlier, or a 38% fall once the base period's single US$3.4bn financing is removed.35 |
| Why the gap persists | Manager domicile is published and capital source is not. SEBI collects the capital-source split every quarter and publishes it as a static table per quarter, never as a series, so nobody runs it. The deal-value measure also has a mechanical bias in exactly this environment: it is a ratio, and foreign funds write the largest cheques, so when large tickets stop the share rises without any domestic manager winning anything. Deals above US$120m fell from 27% of H1 value to 18% in this very half.3 |
| What proves consensus right | Domestic Category II capital and India private-credit fundraising hold their run-rate through two consecutive quarters of rising US private-credit defaults, with no widening in India private-credit pricing. Concretely: if the Category II domestic share gains more than 4 points in the year to Mar 2027 and deployment recovers above a US$10bn annualised pace, the substitution is real at pace and this report is wrong. We will score it in public. |
In Jul 2026, after our data window closed, Shapoorji Pallonji raised about ₹151bn (US$1.6bn) in rupee bonds subscribed by a domestic group including InCred Capital, DSP Finance and IIFL Capital.16 It is among the largest private credit financings ever completed in India and it carried no foreign anchor. If the domestic book can absorb a ticket that size unaided, the capacity constraint this report emphasises is looser than the capital-source panel implies. Our answer is that one financing is not a run rate, and that the same deal in 2025 was foreign-led. The reader now has both facts and can weigh them.
On the medium-term direction we hold no variant view. India's private credit will keep getting more domestically funded, because the savings pool is growing and the rules favour onshore vehicles. The disagreement is entirely about how far along that path the market currently is, and about what would move us. One quarter of domestic-share gain above 2 points would move us toward consensus faster than any deal-value print could. It would most likely come from insurers, or from a widening of the regulated-entity caps.
53.3% domestic at Mar 2026 against a quoted 74%. The two measure different things and only one of them is about money.1
US$3.5bn against US$9.0bn a year earlier, or −38% ex the base period's mega-deal. Large tickets left first.35
₹8.30 lakh crore uncalled and the drawn ratio at 34.9%, its lowest in eight quarters, in the record-commitment quarter.1
182 new Category II funds in FY25-26 and 94 more since, the two largest cohorts on record, while deals fell.2
35% of deal value in the sector the same lenders rank most likely to default.321
Allocator: commit, but pace against called capital and ask for the LP source split. Credit underwriter: price real-estate correlation and the move down-ticket. Policymaker: publish the credit-only Category II cut and revisit whether the 10% cap is buying safety at the cost of the domestic funding you want. Corporate borrower: the offshore route is cheaper than it has been in a decade; the onshore bid is competitive because there are more funds, not more money.
The domestic share everyone quotes counts which manager signed the cheque. The register that counts whose money it was gives a different, slower answer.
Every account of India's private credit market this month rests on one figure. Domestic funds wrote 74% of deal value and close to 79% of deal count in the first half of 2026.3 The figure is correctly calculated and it is being asked to do work it cannot do. It counts transactions above US$10m and attributes each to the domicile of the arranging manager. So a fund registered in Mumbai counts as domestic whether its money came from a Bengaluru family office or a Canadian pension plan.
That distinction is not academic in a market where the largest managers are deliberately structured to pool both. India's alternative funds raise from resident investors, non-resident Indians and foreign portfolio investors. They also raise from a fourth category of offshore institutions that SEBI groups together and does not name.1 Deal-value shares are blind to all of it by construction. They are computed from deal announcements, and an announcement carries a manager, not a capital table.
| Measure | Counts | Universe | Value | As of |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deal value by manager domicile | Which fund house arranged the transaction | Deals above US$10m | 74% | H1 2026 |
| Deal count by manager domicile | Same, unweighted by size | Deals above US$10m | ~79% | H1 2026 |
| Capital increment by investor source | Whose money was added over the year | All Category II funds | 65.8% | Mar 2026 |
| Capital stock by investor source | Whose money is in the funds today | All Category II funds | 53.3% | Mar 2026 |
Treat the 74% as a market-structure statistic about who intermediates, which is what it is. Stop treating it as a funding statistic about who bears the risk. The two answers differ by twenty points, and that gap is the offshore capital sitting inside Indian-domiciled funds. If you are diligencing a manager, do not ask where the fund is registered. Ask what share of its committed capital came from investors who cannot redeem into a foreign currency.
SEBI's quarterly activity tables carry a report titled Fund raised from foreign and domestic investors in AIFs, and it answers the question the deal-value share cannot.1 At 31 Mar 2026 Category II funds had raised ₹2,75,771 crore from domestic investors and ₹2,41,230 crore from foreign ones, a domestic share of 53.3%. It is published as a static snapshot each quarter and never as a series, which is why the number is not in circulation.
Reading it correctly turns on one structural point. The header Funds raised from foreign investors is a parent spanning four sub-columns, so FPIs, FVCIs, NRIs and Others are all foreign, and there is no foreign subtotal. Read "Others" as a residual or as unclassified domestic money and the answer inverts. That column alone holds ₹2,27,720 crore, or 44% of gross Category II capital.1 We verified the structure against the raw table: five values against seven labels parses only one way.
| Printed header | Row values, Category I Infrastructure, Mar 2026 | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Funds raised from domestic investors | 7,235 | Domestic |
| Funds raised from foreign investors | (spans the four columns below) | Parent header, no value |
| FPIs | – | Foreign |
| FVCIs | 4,900 | Foreign |
| NRIs | 161 | Foreign |
| Others | 1,698 | Foreign |
The largest single pool of money in India's Category II funds is a foreign column with no published definition. It grew from ₹1,50,301 crore to ₹2,27,720 crore in two years.1 Every claim about how domestically funded this market is rests on a bucket nobody can describe. Until SEBI defines it, the honest position is 53.3% domestic with a wide unknown attached to the rest.
Assembled into the series SEBI never publishes, the capital-source split shows a steady climb rather than a break. The domestic share of Category II capital ran 48.2% at Mar 2024, 50.8% at Mar 2025 and 53.3% at Mar 2026, with one small reversal in the Jun 2025 quarter.128 That is 5.2 points in two years, and extended at the same pace it reaches two-thirds around 2031. A respectable structural trend, and not the handover the deal-value figure implies.
The composition underneath the trend is more interesting than the trend. Foreign portfolio investors have collapsed as a source, from ₹18,378 crore at Mar 2024 to ₹2,154 crore two years later. Over the same span the unnamed "Others" column grew by ₹77,419 crore.1 So foreign money has not left Category II. It changed the door it comes through, moving out of the reported FPI channel and into the one with no published definition. A domestic share that rises because the most transparent foreign category shrank is a worse signal than it looks.
| Quarter end | Domestic | FPI | FVCI | NRI | Others | Foreign | Domestic % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 2024 | 1,63,469 | 18,378 | 700 | 6,513 | 1,50,301 | 1,75,892 | 48.17 |
| Mar 2025 | 2,17,730 | 1,087 | 860 | 8,519 | 2,00,636 | 2,11,102 | 50.77 |
| Dec 2025 | 2,59,480 | 1,116 | 731 | 9,570 | 2,18,662 | 2,30,079 | 53.00 |
| Mar 2026 | 2,75,771 | 2,154 | 890 | 10,466 | 2,27,720 | 2,41,230 | 53.34 |
Two and a half points a year is the number to plan against. Model the pace of self-funding off the capital series, not the deal series. Expect the domestic share near 58% in 2028, not approaching the 74% already quoted. The faster path exists, but it runs through insurers and the regulated-entity caps, not through fundraising momentum among family offices.
The headline framing of the half is that US$3.5bn of private credit was deployed, broadly in line with the US$3.4bn of the preceding six months.3 That is accurate, and it compares this half to the weakest half in the series. Against the same period a year earlier, when US$9.0bn was deployed, the fall is 61%.5 Much of that base was one transaction, the roughly US$3.4bn Shapoorji Pallonji financing of May 2025; strip it out and US$5.6bn becomes US$3.5bn, a fall of 38%.
Deal counts moved the other way, which makes the contraction legible. There were 102 transactions above US$10m in H1 2026, against 87 in H2 2025 and 79 in H1 2025.34 More deals, less money. The average ticket fell from US$114m to US$34m, and even against the ex-mega-deal base of US$72m it more than halved.28 For scale, Moody's puts India's private credit assets at about US$25bn at the end of 2025, doubled in five years, on more than US$11bn of annual transaction value.29
| Half | Deployed, US$bn | Deals >US$10m | Average ticket, US$m | Domestic manager share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1 2025 | 9.0 | 79 | 114 | not stated |
| H2 2025 | 3.4 | 87 | 39 | ~64% |
| H1 2026 | 3.5 | 102 | 34 | 74% |
Watch the average ticket, not the total. Cheques above US$100m are the ones global managers write and domestic managers mostly cannot. A recovery with the average still near US$35m is domestic managers working harder; a recovery with the average back above US$70m is foreign capital returning, and it will show up as the domestic share falling.
Applying the reported shares to the reported totals settles who did what. At roughly 64% of US$3.4bn, domestic managers deployed about US$2.2bn in H2 2025; at 74% of US$3.5bn they deployed about US$2.6bn in H1 2026, while foreign managers fell from about US$1.2bn to about US$0.9bn.34 The ten-point share gain sits on those two movements: domestic up about US$0.4bn, foreign down about US$0.3bn. Domestic deployment therefore grew about 19% half-on-half while foreign fell about 25%, which is real substitution at the margin and the strongest number on the other side of this argument.
The ticket-size data says the same thing. Transactions above US$120m fell from 27% of deal value to 18% while the US$10–60m band rose from 51% to 61%.3 Large tickets are where global managers concentrate, because a fund with US$5bn to deploy cannot build a book out of US$30m loans. When the large end goes quiet, the domicile share of what remains rises without anyone taking business from anyone.
| Ticket band | H2 2025 | H1 2026 | Change | Who writes it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Above US$120m | 27% | 18% | −9 pts | Global managers, offshore vehicles |
| US$10–60m | 51% | 61% | +10 pts | Domestic mid-market funds, NBFC platforms |
The observable that tests the substitution thesis is the top of the ticket distribution. While the story is compositional, the domestic share and the share of value above US$120m move in opposite directions. Once domestic managers write large cheques off their own capital, the two move together. They have diverged for two halves running.
Global private credit is having its first bad year. Nothing in the Indian data shows it. This part runs the two sides against each other on the same metrics, then asks what would actually carry a shock between them.
Global private credit crossed US$2tn of assets in 2026 and met its first genuine downturn in the same year.13 Fitch's trailing-twelve-month US private credit default rate reached 6.0% in the second quarter, its highest on record, and stayed at a record 6.1% through July.10 Across the roughly 1,300 borrowers Fitch tracks, the quarter produced 32 default events from 20 first-time defaulters.
The funding side moved before the credit side did. In March, Ares limited withdrawals from its US$10.7bn Strategic Income Fund after investors asked to redeem 11.6% against a 5% quarterly gate; in June, Apollo did the same at its Debt Solutions vehicle after requests reached 17%, roughly US$2.4bn.1415 The Financial Stability Board had flagged the sector's valuation opacity and bank linkages in May.11 None of these are Indian institutions, and all of them sit upstream of Indian feeders.
| Sector | Managers expecting stress | Read-across to India |
|---|---|---|
| Consumer & retail | 56% | Limited: India's private credit book is not consumer-facing |
| Automotive | 42% | Limited direct exposure in the Indian book |
| Hospitality & leisure | 27% | Present but small |
| Technology | 24% | Indirect, via venture debt and growth lending |
The global stress is a funding-and-liquidity event first and a credit event second, and that ordering matters for India. India's borrowers are not the ones defaulting. India's lenders' lenders are the ones being asked for their money back. Anyone underwriting an India private credit fund with an offshore feeder should be reading the feeder's redemption terms, not the Indian borrower's coverage ratio.
India's credit conditions in Aug 2026 read as expansionary. The policy repo rate is 5.25% and the ten-year government bond yields about 6.86%.26 System credit growth touched a four-year high near 20% in the June quarter, bank deposits accelerated to 15.4% year-on-year by mid-August, and bank lending to non-bank finance companies grew 14.4% against 11.1% a year earlier.2722 The Reserve Bank's June Financial Stability Report calls the system resilient and non-banks well capitalised.8
What that tells us about private credit is less than it appears. India has no listed business-development-company equivalent, no daily-priced private credit fund and no traded index of private credit spreads. Category II funds report to SEBI quarterly and cumulatively. So the absence of a stress signal is partly an absence of instruments capable of producing one. The first place Indian stress becomes visible is a fund's own valuation committee, and those marks are not public.
| Indicator | Level | Year earlier | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|
| Policy repo rate | 5.25% | — | Accommodative, minutes hawkish |
| Bank credit to non-banks, YoY | 14.4% | 11.1% | Accelerating |
| Bank deposit growth, YoY | 15.4% | 12.7% | Accelerating |
| Non-bank capital ratio, severe stress | 20.9% | 22.8% base | Holds the 15% floor in aggregate |
Do not read the calm as confirmation. The Indian data is genuinely good, and it measures banks, bonds and deposits, none of which is where a private credit problem appears first. For an early Indian signal, build the quarterly draw ratio on Category II commitments and the ticket-size distribution. Both are in this report and neither is published as a series by anyone.
The decoupling argument is usually made by asserting that India is different. It is more useful to put the two markets side by side on the same measures at the same date. Then you can see which lines genuinely diverge, which are simply not collected in India, and which have not been tested. Four of the eight below genuinely diverge. Two move the same way on both sides. Two cannot be compared at all, because India does not produce the number.
| Metric | Source side (US / global) | Arrival side (India) | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Default rate on the private book | 6.1% TTM, a record10 | Not published for private credit | Not comparable |
| Fund redemption pressure | Gates at Apollo (17%) and Ares (11.6%)1514 | Closed-end funds, no redemption right | Structural divergence |
| Secondary pricing of fund stakes | Listed vehicles at 20–25% discounts to stated value | No listed vehicle exists | Not comparable |
| Deployment trend | Slowing; refinancing wall ahead13 | −38% year-on-year, ex mega-deal3 | Both falling |
| Fundraising trend | AUM still rising toward US$2tn13 | Commitments +25% YoY20 | Both rising |
| Bank exposure to the channel | Rising; an FSB concern11 | Capped at 10% per scheme6 | India tighter |
| Regulatory direction | Scrutiny of marks and leverage11 | Onshore tightened, offshore loosened69 | Opposite |
| Sector concentration | Consumer, auto, tech12 | Real estate, 35% of value3 | Genuinely different |
Two of the eight rows favour India on structure, and they are the two that matter most. Indian funds are closed-end, so no Indian LP can force a fire sale, and Indian banks are held to a tenth of any scheme. That is real insulation and we do not dispute it. What the ledger also shows is that two of the eight comparisons cannot be made at all, because India does not produce the number. An argument built on rows that are blank is not an argument about India's resilience. It is an argument about India's disclosure.
Because Indian funds are closed-end and unlisted, the fast channels that carry stress between public markets do not exist here. There is no daily mark to gap, no index to sell and no redemption right to exercise. What is left are three slow channels. All of them run through the balance sheets of the people who committed the money, not through any price.
The first is the offshore feeder. A global manager gating its flagship does not stop lending in India. But the LP that just failed to redeem in New York reconsiders its next India commitment. The second is the drawdown itself. Commitments are called in tranches over years, and an LP under liquidity pressure negotiates, defers, or in the extreme defaults on a call. The third is the denominator effect. Falling values elsewhere in an allocator's book push private credit above its target weight, and new commitments stop without any view on India at all. An LP that needs cash has a global secondaries market to sell into, and it set a record US$121bn in H1 2026.24 Indian fund stakes have no equivalent bid, so the pressure lands on the next commitment instead of on a price.
| Channel | First visible in | Published? | Estimated lag |
|---|---|---|---|
| Offshore feeder commitments | SEBI foreign-investor line, Category II | Quarterly, aggregated | 2–4 quarters |
| Drawdown pacing | Ratio of funds raised to commitments | Quarterly, derivable | 1–3 quarters |
| Denominator effect at LPs | New scheme launches and first closes | Not published | 3–6 quarters |
If you hold India private credit fund stakes, ask your manager each quarter for the call rate against schedule. Not the portfolio's default rate. Defaults are the last thing to move in a closed-end structure and capital calls are the first. On our estimated lags, a shock originating in the Mar 2026 gates would begin showing in Indian commitment data somewhere between late 2026 and mid-2027.
On 16 Feb 2026 the Reserve Bank rewrote India's external commercial borrowing framework. It removed the all-in-cost ceiling that had capped what an Indian borrower could pay a foreign lender, replaced the eligibility tests with a general permission for any registered entity, set a single ceiling of US$1bn or 300% of net worth, and let offshore and IFSC branches of Indian banks lend rupees.9 The explicit purpose was to let offshore credit price itself to the market.
That matters for measurement as much as for supply. A foreign fund lending to an Indian company through this route never appears in SEBI's Category II tables. Nor does it show up as a deal by a domestic manager. Nor does a GIFT City vehicle. Retail fund registrations there alone passed US$2bn of assets by Dec 2025, and Category I and II funds get full pass-through tax treatment.23 So the same regulatory year that capped the onshore institutional channel made the offshore one cheaper, and both changes push the measured domestic share up.
| Date | Change | Effect on the onshore channel | Effect on the offshore one |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Jan 2026 | Regulated entities capped at 10% of a scheme, 20% collectively6 | Tighter | None |
| 16 Feb 2026 | Borrowing cost caps removed; US$1bn or 300% of net worth ceiling9 | None | Cheaper, broader |
If you are a corporate treasurer, the offshore route is cheaper and more flexible than at any point in a decade. The onshore bid is competitive because there are more funds, not more money. Take the meeting with both. For everyone else the warning is about the metric. A domestic share computed only on onshore fund activity will keep rising as offshore borrowing grows, which is the opposite of what it appears to say.
India's private credit is concentrated in real estate, which the lenders themselves rank as their highest default risk. The number that made it look like a record is partly an accounting change we cannot close.
Real estate absorbed 35% of India's private credit deal value in the first half of 2026, ahead of healthcare at about 13% and food and beverage at 12%.3 In the same firm's June survey, those investors ranked real estate the sector most likely to default, ahead of roads, energy, renewables, metals and manufacturing.321 They are not confused. They are being paid for it, at 14–18% net for construction-stage lending against 12–16% in healthcare.
The concentration is defensible deal by deal and hard to defend as a book. Indian developers face a funding gap banks will not fill. A lender who underwrites the project, the escrow and the sales velocity can earn a genuine premium. What that logic does not address is correlation. A third of the book depends on one refinancing environment, one set of approval timelines and one rate path. When the sector turns, it turns for everyone holding it, and the marks arrive quarterly and unpriced.
| Sector | Share of H1 2026 value | Perceived default risk | Indicative net IRR |
|---|---|---|---|
| Real estate | 35% | Highest ranked | 14–18% |
| Healthcare | ~13% | Not in the top group | 12–16% |
| Food & beverage | 12% | Not in the top group | not disclosed |
| Everything else | ~40% | Roads, energy, metals ranked next | 12–24% band |
Price this as correlation, not as a view on Indian property. A fund with a third of its book in one sector is selling you a diversified credit product and running a concentrated one. The premium it earns is compensation for exactly that. Hold several India private credit funds and the sector weights stack; look through to the combined figure before adding another. The managers are largely lending to the same borrower set.
Alternative funds' investment in Indian real estate was widely reported in June as reaching a record ₹1.29 lakh crore.20 SEBI's own series shows why that reading needs care. Real-estate investment sat between ₹69,896 crore and ₹75,350 crore for five consecutive quarters from Dec 2024, then rose ₹53,587 crore in the Mar 2026 quarter alone.128 Total investment across all sectors rose only ₹31,339 crore in the same quarter, and the residual "Others" category fell ₹32,745 crore.
A category cannot grow by more than the whole while its neighbour shrinks unless something has moved between them. On these numbers at most ₹20,842 crore of the increase is new money, and roughly three-fifths is reclassification. SEBI has published no note explaining the change and we have not obtained one, so we report the arithmetic and leave the question open. It is the second of two things in this report we cannot resolve.
| Line | Dec 2025 | Mar 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Real estate | 75,350 | 1,28,937 | +53,587 |
| Others (residual) | 3,45,592 | 3,12,847 | −32,745 |
| Total investments made | 6,45,026 | 6,76,365 | +31,339 |
Two readings fit. Either roughly ₹33,000 crore of existing exposure was reclassified into real estate. Or deployment was extraordinary in one quarter while an equally extraordinary amount left the residual bucket for unrelated reasons. We find the first more likely and cannot demonstrate it. Treat every real-estate share computed off this table, including ours, as carrying that uncertainty.
Set the two most recent halves side by side and the sector mix is unstable everywhere except the top line. Real estate fell from 42% of deal value in H2 2025 to 35% in H1 2026, and healthcare from about 15% to about 13%. Industrial products dropped out of the leading group entirely, and food and beverage rose from roughly 1% to 12%.43 An eleven-point move in a single half is not a sector allocation. It is a handful of transactions.
That instability compounds the move down-ticket. With average cheques at US$34m and 102 borrowers instead of 79, a fund builds its book from more names. They sit in less predictable sectors, with less leverage in each negotiation.328 Mid-market lending is a perfectly good business and it is a different business from the one these funds raised money to do. The diligence question is about the team. Are the people writing US$34m cheques into food processing the ones hired to write US$150m cheques into infrastructure holdcos?
| Measure | H2 2025 | H1 2026 | What it implies for the lender |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deals above US$10m | 87 | 102 | More names to monitor per rupee lent |
| Average ticket | US$39m | US$34m | Fixed diligence cost spread over less |
| Real estate share | 42% | 35% | Still the dominant single exposure |
| Food & beverage share | ~1% | 12% | A new sector underwritten at speed |
Read a fund's sector drift as a capacity signal. When a manager's stated strategy is large structured credit and its recent book is mid-market food and beverage, the constraint is deal supply, not conviction. That is not disqualifying, but it should change the fee conversation. A fund charging structured-credit economics to run a mid-market lending book is charging for scarcity it no longer has.
The clearest winner is the Indian borrower. More funds are competing for fewer large deals, and since February the offshore route has had no cost ceiling. That is the best negotiating position a mid-sized Indian corporate has had in a decade.9 Mid-market domestic managers win too: the US$10–60m band grew from 51% to 61% of value and it is a band foreign funds structurally cannot serve.3
The large domestic houses are genuinely two-sided and we decline to net them. They have taken share and are raising the biggest domestic pools the market has seen. Kotak's ₹3,900 crore first close came from Indian family offices, wealthy individuals and insurers, with no offshore anchor.25 They are also competing with 182 new Category II funds registered in one year for a shrinking pool of large transactions. That is a pricing problem regardless of how much they raise.2 Whether share or spread dominates depends on which the reader is exposed to, and we do not think the evidence settles it.
| Participant | Gains | Pays | Net |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indian borrowers | More lenders, no cost ceiling offshore | Nothing yet | Wins |
| Mid-market domestic funds | A band foreign capital cannot serve | Thinner names, more monitoring | Wins |
| Large domestic houses | Share, and the largest domestic pools raised | 182 new competitors, fewer large deals | Split, not netted |
| Foreign managers | A cheaper offshore route since February | Onshore share, and the narrative | Loses onshore, gains offshore |
| Limited partners | Access at record fund availability | A capacity build into a shrinking market | Loses on vintage timing |
The participant with the weakest hand is the one being marketed to hardest. Limited partners are being offered more India private credit funds than ever. It is the point in the cycle when deployment has halved and 276 Category II vehicles have registered in eighteen months. That is not an argument against the asset class. It is an argument for being the LP who asks what the manager's realistic deployment pace is before agreeing to the fund size.
Two-thirds of the domestic bid has never been called. Record numbers of funds are forming to chase a market that has halved. This part prices what that does to a vintage.
Category II funds held ₹12.74 lakh crore of commitments at 31 Mar 2026 and had called ₹4.44 lakh crore of it, leaving ₹8.30 lakh crore uncalled.1 The drawn ratio has sat in a narrow 35–36.5% band for two years, which is normal for closed-end funds calling capital over an investment period. What is not normal is the direction it moved in the latest quarter. Commitments rose ₹1.10 lakh crore, the largest single-quarter increase in the series, and the drawn ratio fell to 34.9%, the lowest reading in it.28
A commitment is a contractual obligation, so this is not a claim that the money is imaginary. It is a claim about sequencing and about who is committing. Bank and insurer commitments are hard; family-office and individual commitments are contractually hard and practically negotiable, and they are the pools that have grown fastest. Had the drawn ratio simply held December's level, about ₹21,000 crore more would have been called by March. The gap between headline fund size and deployable money is widening at exactly the moment the industry is quoting headline fund size.
| Quarter end | Commitments | Funds raised | Uncalled | Drawn |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 2025 | 10,30,041 | 3,66,621 | 6,63,420 | 35.6% |
| Dec 2025 | 11,64,118 | 4,24,964 | 7,39,154 | 36.5% |
| Mar 2026 | 12,74,300 | 4,44,122 | 8,30,178 | 34.9% |
Pace against called capital, not fund size. A ₹5,000 crore fund that has called ₹1,700 crore is a ₹1,700 crore lender. In a market where deployment fell 38% it may stay one for longer than its vintage assumed. The industry ratio is the cheapest early-warning series available on India private credit, and SEBI's tables yield it every quarter. As far as we can tell, nobody publishes it.
Decoding SEBI's registration numbers gives a formation series the register itself does not present.228 Category II registrations ran 123 in FY2023-24, 144 in FY2024-25 and 182 in FY2025-26, the heaviest year on record, with 94 more already added in FY2026-27. The most funds ever formed, and the least money deployed since 2024.
More lenders chasing fewer transactions has a predictable sequence and India is early in it. Spreads compress, covenant packages loosen, then managers move into adjacent sectors they underwrite less well, which the food and beverage line already shows. None of it appears in returns for two to three years, because a loan that will default in 2029 pays interest perfectly in 2026. Competition is also arriving from outside the fund industry: Moody's expects the new RBI norms permitting banks to finance acquisitions to compress yields in a segment alternative capital has had largely to itself.29
| Period | New Category II funds | Deployment, US$bn | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023-24 / FY2024-25 | 123 / 144 | — | Building |
| CY2025 | — | 12.4 | Record deployment |
| FY2025-26 and since | 276 | 3.5 in H1 2026 | Diverging |
Treat 2026 and 2027 as vintages to underwrite rather than to buy on brand. The managers who deploy well from here will be the ones who can hold cash. Holding cash is the hardest thing to do with a fee clock running. When you diligence, ask what the manager declined in the last four quarters and why. A manager who cannot name a deal it walked away from in this market is not being selective.
The arithmetic of the asset class is straightforward. With the policy rate at 5.25% and the ten-year government bond near 6.86%, a performing private credit loan at 12–18% earns 514 to 1,114 basis points over the risk-free rate, and the high-yield end at 22% earns about 1,514.263 Two-thirds of surveyed investors target above 18%, and a third target 12–18%, so the market is priced closer to the top of that range than the bottom.3
The question is what that spread has to absorb. Fees take a few hundred basis points before anything else. Then losses. At a 35% real-estate weight and a 40% loss given default, every 10% of that sub-book that defaults costs roughly 140bp at the fund level, and 15% costs about 210bp.28 A 1,100bp gross spread is a comfortable buffer against that and a thin one against the compression that record fund formation implies. The buffer is real today and it is the thing competition removes first.
| Real-estate sub-book default rate | At 35% weight, 40% LGD | Against an 1,100bp gross spread |
|---|---|---|
| 5% | 70bp | 6% of the spread |
| 10% | 140bp | 13% of the spread |
| 15% | 210bp | 19% of the spread |
The spread is wide enough to absorb a bad real-estate year and not wide enough to absorb a bad real-estate year at compressed pricing. That makes entry pricing the variable to hold discipline on. A fund writing at 14% into the sector its peers rank riskiest has already given away most of the cushion this table measures. Do not accept target IRR as evidence of underwriting. Ask what the manager's realised loss rate has been across prior vintages, and note if no vintage has fully run off.
The domestic half of Category II capital comes from several places that behave very differently under stress. Banks and non-bank lenders are the steadiest. Since 1 Jan 2026 no regulated entity may contribute more than 10% of a scheme's corpus, with all of them together capped at 20%.6 That rule protects bank balance sheets and removes the most supervised source of domestic money from the market policymakers want domestically funded.
Insurers sit next, and IRDAI spent February clarifying rather than expanding their access, with conditions on excusal rights, overseas exposure and single-fund limits.19 The Employees' Provident Fund Organisation, the largest domestic retirement pool, does not invest in alternatives at all. So the growth comes from family offices and wealthy individuals. That pool is the most correlated with Indian equities, and the likeliest to slow commitments exactly when a manager needs capital called. Kotak's ₹3,900 crore first close came from that base.25
| Source | Constraint | Behaviour under stress |
|---|---|---|
| Banks and non-bank lenders | 10% per scheme, 20% collectively6 | Sticky, contractually bound |
| Insurers | Conditions on excusal rights and single-fund limits19 | Sticky, slow to commit |
| Family offices and individuals | None binding | Pro-cyclical, negotiable in practice |
| Provident and pension funds | No alternatives mandate | Absent entirely |
The fastest route to a genuinely domestic market runs through IRDAI and the retirement system, not through fundraising momentum. Widen the insurer limits materially, or give the provident fund system an alternatives allocation. Either would move the domestic share further in a year than it has moved in four. Neither is proposed, which is why our base case holds the drift near two and a half points a year.
The single most useful thing to do with the capital series is to extrapolate it honestly. At the observed 2.59 points a year, the domestic share of Category II capital reaches 58.5% in Mar 2028 and does not reach the 74% currently quoted until around 2034.28 That is the base case, and it is the number to price a fifteen-year view of India's credit market against, not the deal-value share.
Three variables move it. The first is the insurer and pension channel, the only one large enough to change the slope rather than the level. A material widening would add several points in a single year. The second is the offshore route, cheaper since February. It pushes the measured onshore share up while doing nothing for genuine self-funding. The third is deployment. Returning to the H1 2025 run rate needs 157% growth from here, and if it comes on foreign tickets the domestic share falls even as the market improves.
| Variable | Move | Effect on the share | Direction of the market |
|---|---|---|---|
| Insurer or pension access widens | A material limit increase | +3 to +6 pts in a year | Genuinely deeper |
| Offshore borrowing grows | Post-Feb 2026 route scales | Share rises, measure worsens | Less self-funded |
| Deployment recovers on large tickets | +157% to the H1 2025 pace | Share falls | Healthier, less domestic |
Two of the three variables move the market and the metric in opposite directions. A healthier India private credit market would have large foreign tickets returning and offshore capital priced freely. It would print a falling domestic share and be read as a reversal. Anyone using the domestic share as a signal should use the capital series. Read a decline in it as good news about the market, not bad.
Five rule changes in twelve months, all pushing credit supply the same way. What that leaves is a set of scenarios and a register of what could break. Then a call for each desk that has to act on it.
India's alternative funds have been rewritten five times since Sep 2025, and read together the changes have a direction. SEBI created a co-investment vehicle framework in September. In November it added an accredited-investors-only fund exempt from pari-passu and investor-cap rules, and cut the large-value fund minimum from ₹70 crore to ₹25 crore.1718 Those are liberalising, and they liberalise for the wealthy individual rather than the institution.
The two that move the most money go the other way. From 1 January the Reserve Bank capped any regulated entity at 10% of a scheme and all of them together at 20%. That binds precisely the banks and insurers whose money is stickiest.6 Six weeks later the same regulator removed the cost ceiling on external commercial borrowing.9 Then in August it proposed barring most non-bank lenders from revolving credit altogether. This desk sized that change separately; it pushes another slice of borrower demand toward funds.7
| Date | Change | Who it helps | Net on onshore institutional supply |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | Co-investment vehicle framework17 | Accredited investors | Neutral |
| Nov–Dec 2025 | Accredited-investors-only fund; large-value minimum cut to ₹25 crore18 | Wealthy individuals | Neutral to positive |
| 1 Jan 2026 | Regulated entities capped at 10% / 20%6 | Bank balance sheets | Tighter |
| 12 Feb 2026 | IRDAI clarifies insurer AIF conditions19 | Clarity, not capacity | Neutral |
| 16 Feb 2026 | Borrowing cost caps removed9 | Offshore lenders | Diverts demand offshore |
Policy is optimising each piece and not the system. Capping regulated entities is defensible bank supervision. Liberalising offshore borrowing is defensible capital-account policy. Together they make India's private credit market less domestically funded than either department intends. The two changes worth weighing in policy are the ones nobody has proposed. A wider insurer allocation, and publishing the credit-only cut of Category II so the argument can be settled with data.
Our base case is that deployment recovers to US$8–11bn in CY2027 and the domestic capital share reaches 55–58% by Mar 2028, continuing the observed drift.28 It assumes the 10% and 20% caps stay, the repo rate stays within 50bp of 5.25%, and India has no credit event above ₹10,000 crore. It is a dull scenario and we weight it most heavily.
The bear case is a different mechanism, not the base case scaled down. It begins with a developer refinancing failure, and because Indian funds are closed-end the stress cannot express itself as redemptions, so it expresses itself as capital-call defaults by over-committed family offices, extension requests on funds at the end of their investment periods, and secondary sales of fund stakes at discounts into a market with no natural buyer. Marks stay high while cash stops moving, and the first public evidence is a fund quietly extending rather than a price falling. The bull case is simpler and needs a regulator. A material widening of insurer or pension access changes the slope of the domestic share rather than its level.
| Case | CY2027 deployment | Domestic share, Mar 2028 | What has to be true |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | US$5–7bn | 53–55% | A developer cascade; call defaults and fund extensions; formation stops |
| Base | US$8–11bn | 55–58% | Caps unchanged, repo within 50bp, no event above ₹10,000 crore |
| Bull | US$13–16bn | above 60% | IRDAI widens insurer limits or the retirement system takes an allocation |
Watch for extensions, not for defaults. In a closed-end market the first honest signal of the bear case is a fund asking its investors for more time. That request is made privately. If you sit on an advisory committee, watch for an extension request in 2027 from a 2021 or 2022 vintage. It carries more information than any default statistic India will publish.
Stating the boundary is part of the disclosure. Not sized here: the offshore channels of §10. This desk has not estimated the volume of credit reaching Indian borrowers through external commercial borrowing, GIFT City vehicles or foreign portfolio investment in corporate debt. We have not filled the gap with a number. Not covered: venture debt as a separate segment, asset reconstruction companies and the stressed-asset resolution route, and lending to Indian borrowers booked wholly offshore. Not measurable: realised loss rates for Indian private credit, because no vintage-level loss series is published by anyone. That is why §17 works from stated assumptions rather than from history.
Currency risk is immaterial to the onshore book, which lends rupees to rupee-earning borrowers; it reaches this market only through the offshore feeders of §09. A change to Category II pass-through tax treatment would be material, but nothing is proposed, and speculating on unproposed policy is not a risk assessment. India-specific geopolitical risk is real. It does not transmit to this asset class faster than to the wider credit market, so it is not listed as a private-credit risk.
This report has argued one thing throughout. India's private credit is more domestically intermediated than it was, and less domestically funded than it is being described. The difference matters because the measure in circulation improves fastest when foreign capital withdraws. Domestic managers write 74% of the deals. Domestic investors supply 53.3% of the capital, and at the observed pace that number reaches 74% in 2034.
Allocators. Commit selectively and pace against called capital rather than fund size. Ask for the LP split by source, not by feeder domicile, and for the fund's own draw pace against schedule. Credit underwriters. Price real-estate concentration as correlation and the move down-ticket as a monitoring cost; the spread is wide today and it is what competition takes first. Policymakers. Publish the credit-only Category II split, and weigh whether the 10% cap is buying bank safety at the price of the domestic funding you want. Corporate borrowers. Your position is the strongest in a decade; run the onshore and offshore routes against each other.
Five observables, dated and checkable. Any two would move us toward consensus.
| Observable | Level that would move us | By when |
|---|---|---|
| Category II domestic capital share | Gains more than 4 points in one year | Mar 2027 data |
| Deployment | Recovers above a US$10bn annualised pace | H1 2027 report |
| Average ticket size | Returns above US$70m | H1 2027 report |
| Insurer or pension access | A material limit increase is notified | any time |
| Drawn ratio | Recovers above 36.5% and holds two quarters | Dec 2026 data |
Two questions this report raises and does not answer. First, what sits inside SEBI's foreign "Others" column. At ₹2,27,720 crore it is the largest single pool of money in Category II, and it carries no published definition. Second, whether the Mar 2026 real-estate jump is deployment or reclassification; the arithmetic favours reclassification and we cannot demonstrate it. Both would be settled by disclosure this desk cannot compel, and neither is resolved by anything else in these pages.
Medium conviction, Cautious. Not a call against India private credit, which remains structurally advantaged and well paid. A call against buying the 2026 vintage on a statistic that measures intermediation and is being read as funding. The most funds ever formed are competing for the least money deployed in two years.
In scope: private credit extended to Indian borrowers through onshore alternative investment funds, and the capital raised by those funds. Out of scope, and disclosed as such. Credit reaching Indian borrowers through external commercial borrowing, GIFT City vehicles, foreign portfolio investment in corporate debt, and offshore-booked lending. This desk has not sized those channels and has not substituted an estimate for them. Also out of scope: venture debt as a distinct segment, asset reconstruction companies, and the stressed-asset resolution route.
SEBI publishes no credit-only cut of Category II, which holds private-credit, private-equity, real-estate and debt funds in one bucket. Every capital-source figure in this report therefore describes the onshore alternative-fund channel through which most domestic private credit is raised, not private credit itself. We label it Category II wherever it appears and never as "private credit". A reader who believes the credit-only mix differs materially from the blended mix should discount the capital-share argument accordingly. That possibility is carried in the risk register rather than argued away.
| Figure | Derivation | Tier |
|---|---|---|
| Domestic capital share, 53.3% | Domestic ÷ (domestic + FPI + FVCI + NRI + Others), SEBI investor table, Cat II, gross funds raised | ◐ |
| Capital increment share, 65.8% | Change in domestic ÷ change in total, Mar 2025 to Mar 2026 | ◐ |
| Drawn ratio, 34.9% | Net funds raised ÷ commitments raised, Cat II, cumulative | ◐ |
| Average ticket | Deployment ÷ deal count per half; a mean, not a median | ◐ |
| Registration cohorts | Decoded from IN/AIF{n}/{FY}/{serial} on a live-register snapshot | ◐ |
| Fund-level loss sensitivity | Sector weight × sub-book default rate × 40% assumed loss given default | ○ |
● filed means a regulatory filing or official statistic. ◐ means computed from filed inputs, or a credible secondary estimate; consultancy reports and press coverage are ◐ regardless of what they quote. ○ marks a Gravitywell Research judgement, and every ○ figure in this report is identified where it appears. Every figure carries its as-of date. SEBI restates prior quarters as late filings arrive. This report and its published panel stamp each row with the quarter it describes, and append revisions rather than overwriting. Derived scores and panels follow OECD/JRC composite-indicator practice on transparency of construction and disclosure of coverage. This report carries no index and no rating, so IOSCO benchmark principles are not engaged.
Medium. The core capital series comes from a primary regulatory source, verified against the raw table rather than a summary. That supports a higher rating. Three things hold it to Medium. Category II is a proxy for the asset class, the largest single line in the series carries no published definition, and one sector series contains an unexplained discontinuity. The deal-flow figures come from a single consultancy series with no independent cross-check available.
GWR-2026-IN-004, India's Revolving Credit Ban (20 Aug 2026), sizes the RBI draft at source 7 and supplies the non-bank funding-chain inputs used in §18 and §22. GWW-2026-002, What if private credit cracks? (14 Aug 2026), carries the thirteen-indicator signpost panel referenced in §06 and §09; this report inherits that panel as its live monitoring dashboard. GWR-2026-IN-003, The Exit Window (14 Aug 2026), covers the equity-exit channel that shares the limited-partner liquidity mechanism described in §09.
Forty-three exhibits. Thirty-one are built from primary regulatory sources: SEBI's quarterly activity tables and fund register, RBI circulars and the Financial Stability Report, IRDAI and IFSCA. Nine are built from a single consultancy deal series with no independent cross-check available, and are marked ◐ throughout. Three are this desk's own estimates and are marked ○ where they appear: the transmission lags in FIG 9.1, the loss sensitivity in TABLE 17.1, and the scenario bands in FIG 21.1 and TABLE 21.1.
The underlying series ship as india-private-credit-data.csv alongside this report, and the maintained quarterly panel is published as the Gravitywell Research dataset india-aif-capital-source. Both carry the source number for every datapoint, so any figure here can be traced to its register entry and rebuilt.
The series behind the exhibits, so the argument is reproducible. Tier: ● filed · ◐ modeled · ○ estimate.
| Quarter | Domestic | FPI | FVCI | NRI | Others | Dom % | Tier | Src |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 2024 | 1,63,469 | 18,378 | 700 | 6,513 | 1,50,301 | 48.17 | ● | 1 |
| Jun 2024 | 1,78,668 | 15,062 | 724 | 6,928 | 1,64,424 | 48.84 | ● | 1 |
| Sep 2024 | 1,87,656 | 10,928 | 755 | 7,448 | 1,78,392 | 48.72 | ● | 1 |
| Dec 2024 | 2,01,985 | 6,475 | 787 | 8,404 | 1,88,578 | 49.72 | ● | 1 |
| Mar 2025 | 2,17,730 | 1,087 | 860 | 8,519 | 2,00,636 | 50.77 | ● | 1 |
| Jun 2025 | 2,26,288 | 2,081 | 859 | 8,342 | 2,11,010 | 50.45 | ● | 1 |
| Sep 2025 | 2,42,317 | 1,339 | 870 | 8,756 | 2,13,289 | 51.94 | ● | 1 |
| Dec 2025 | 2,59,480 | 1,116 | 731 | 9,570 | 2,18,662 | 53.00 | ● | 1 |
| Mar 2026 | 2,75,771 | 2,154 | 890 | 10,466 | 2,27,720 | 53.34 | ● | 1 |
| Quarter | Commitments | Funds raised | Investments | Drawn % | Tier | Src |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 2025 | 10,30,041 | 3,66,621 | 3,32,201 | 35.59 | ● | 1 |
| Jun 2025 | 10,78,208 | 3,79,662 | 3,48,423 | 35.21 | ● | 1 |
| Sep 2025 | 11,20,589 | 4,04,212 | 3,69,570 | 36.07 | ● | 1 |
| Dec 2025 | 11,64,118 | 4,24,964 | 3,84,169 | 36.51 | ● | 1 |
| Mar 2026 | 12,74,300 | 4,44,122 | 4,12,628 | 34.85 | ● | 1 |
| Quarter | Real estate | Others | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 2024 | 73,903 | 2,77,970 | — |
| Mar 2025 | 69,896 | 3,00,263 | 5,38,161 |
| Jun 2025 | 70,925 | 3,06,599 | 5,72,246 |
| Sep 2025 | 73,356 | 3,30,379 | 6,11,939 |
| Dec 2025 | 75,350 | 3,45,592 | 6,45,026 |
| Mar 2026 | 1,28,937 | 3,12,847 | 6,76,365 |
| Fiscal year | Cat II | All categories |
|---|---|---|
| FY2021-22 | 94 | 148 |
| FY2022-23 | 128 | 209 |
| FY2023-24 | 123 | 214 |
| FY2024-25 | 144 | 283 |
| FY2025-26 | 182 | 346 |
| FY2026-27 part | 94 | 149 |
Machine-readable: india-private-credit-data.csv ships with this report. The full quarterly panel, including the sector series and every registration cohort back to FY2012-13, is published and maintained as the Gravitywell Research dataset india-aif-capital-source, with its own definitions, source tiers, point-in-time policy, quarterly update commitment and known gaps.
The Gravitywell Research desk responsible for this report certifies that the views expressed accurately reflect its independent judgement about the subjects discussed, and that no part of its compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly tied to the specific recommendations or views expressed herein.
As of the publication date, Gravitywell Research and its analysts do not hold positions in the securities or assets discussed, and have no advisory, banking or commercial relationship with the entities named. This report was not commissioned or reviewed by any issuer, fund manager or regulator named in it.
Conviction High · Medium · Low, set by coverage depth, source tier and how far the thesis has been stress-tested. Stance Constructive · Neutral · Cautious, the direction of the house view on the opportunity. This report: Medium conviction · Cautious. The rationale for Medium rather than High is stated on the Methodology page.
This report passed a pre-writing adversarial review of its thesis and a pre-publication review of its mechanics and argument. Both were run by this desk rather than by an independent reviewer, and we disclose that rather than imply it. A self-run panel is weaker evidence than an independent one. The adjudication of every objection raised, including the two carried unresolved, is recorded in the report's working file.
Prepared for readers who allocate capital, underwrite risk, or set policy across public and private markets. Not for general retail distribution, nor for readers who lack the expertise to assess the assumptions. Intended recipients may not redistribute without attribution. Availability of this research in some jurisdictions may be restricted; recipients are responsible for their local rules. Independent research, not investment advice and not regulated ratings.
Material errors are corrected in a dated erratum appended to this report and noted in the next edition; the permalink always serves the current version. Figures are point-in-time and are never silently restated. Permalink: gravitywellresearch.xyz/research/india-private-credit. Version: GWR-2026-IN-005 · v1.0 · as of 24 Aug 2026.
First edition on India's private credit capital base; there is no prior Gravitywell Research call on this topic to score. Two adjacent house documents are live and their calls remain open: GWW-2026-002 (What if private credit cracks?, 14 Aug 2026) carries an activation call with a 0.15–0.25 band resolving by Feb 2028, and GWR-2026-IN-003 (The Exit Window, 14 Aug 2026) carries five calls on India's IPO window resolving from Jan 2027. Neither has matured, so neither is scored here. Every falsifiable call in this report is logged on publication to the house calls register and will be scored in public, including the misses.
Domestic managers write three of four rupees. Domestic investors supply half the money. At the pace the capital series actually moves, those two numbers meet in 2034.
GWR-2026-IN-005 · Aug 2026. Independent research for capital allocators, risk officers, and policymakers. Not regulated ratings, not investment advice, not an offer or solicitation. Figures are marked to the dates shown and may be revised; Gravitywell Research is under no obligation to update. Sources are cited in the register; while drawn from sources believed reliable, accuracy is not guaranteed. © 2026 Gravitywell Research.